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W
eb 2.0 sites generally revolve around col-
laborative authoring such as blogs, wikis, 
discussion boards, and forums. Unfortu-
nately, the popularity and ease of posting 
comments to blogs have made them attractive vec-
tors for luring visitors to spammers’ websites. Blog 
spam works diferently from conventional email spam 
in that its purpose isn’t necessarily to get visitors to 
click a hyperlink in the spam. Instead, blog links are 
intended to increase the spammer’s website ranking 
among search engines, attracting more visitors to the 
site by listing it higher in search results.1 Blog spam (or 
“link spam”2) on authentic blogs is distinguished from 
spam blogs or “splogs,” which are artiicial blogs with 
fake content created solely to host ads or increase the 
search-engine rankings of spammer websites.3
Blogs have been spam targets for a few years, and 
blogging software has incorporated various means 
to discourage it. Many websites use CAPTCHA, a 
display of alphanumeric text embedded in an image. 
Visitors must copy the text before the site will accept 
comments in a form. CAPTCHA distorts the text or 
otherwise adds noise to challenge a spam tool’s char-
acter-recognition features. A drawback of this method 
is that it can annoy and discourage visitors who want 
to post legitimate comments.
Another means of discouraging blog spam is the 
rel=“nofollow” attribute for hyperlinks. Most 
blog software automatically defaults to give this attri-
bute to any links that get posted. The popular search 
engines don’t count hyperlinks with this attribute 
toward the link target’s rank. However, the attribute 
doesn’t prevent a victim from clicking the hyperlink 
and going to the 
spammer’s site.
LinkSleeve, Akismet, and Defensio are meth-
ods for preventing spam that depend on collab-
orative techniques. They send comments irst to 
a central server that performs tests to determine 
whether the comments are spam. Centralized serv-
ers have the advantage of seeing URLs that appear 
on multiple sites—a key characteristic of spam. This 
collaborative- detection method can efectively pre-
vent link spam, but comment spam that’s designed to 
blend into an ongoing blog discussion is more chal-
lenging to detect.
Despite preventive measures, one recent study es-
timated that 85 percent of blog comments are inserted 
by automated bots.4 Traditional spam ilters aren’t 
very efective against blog spam. For instance, the 
rich features that blogs typically allow make it easy for 
spammers to launch cross-site scripting or drive-by 
download attacks. Coping with such features requires 
more than a spam ilter.
To clarify blog spam’s characteristics, we analyzed 
two weeks of it using a classiier based on support vec-
tor machines (SVMs) enhanced with heuristic rules. 
We present our experimental setup and study results 
here. For related work on classiication of blog spam 
and splogs, see the sidebar.
Characteristics of Blog Spam
Web spam appears in diferent forms: 
• Comment spam—unsolicited posts in editable Web 
pages such as blogs, wikis, and guestbooks for the 
A study of more than one million blog comments during 
the last two weeks of June 2009 showed more than 75 
percent of them to be spam.
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purpose of corrupting the authentic meaning of 
community-provided feedback.2
• Term spam—extraneous words inserted in spam 
 pages to make them seem more relevant to some 
search queries or popular keywords.
• Link spam—unsolicited posts containing URLs 
to increase the number of links pointing toward a 
spammer’s site, thereby increasing the page’s rank in 
search engines. 
• Spam pages—entirely fake webpages created solely to 
mislead a search engine.1 Each fake page receives a 
minimum guaranteed PageRank value, and the ac-
P revious studies have proposed classifying blog spam by ex-amining page contents, hyperlink structures, or both. Marco 
Ramilli and Marco Prandini proposed content analysis to detect 
comment spam.1 Their method consists of a self-learning ilter 
that remembers every posted sentence and associates a score to 
each message according to the number of already-seen sentences 
in it. If the score is above a given threshold, the message is classi-
ied as comment spam.
Na Dai and his colleagues investigated a content-analysis 
method that measured changes in a website’s content over time.2 
Their work presumes that spam drastically increases the fraction 
of popular words on a site. If a page has a sudden increase in 
popular words over a short time interval, they classify it as spam.
Along a similar idea, Yu-ru Lin and his colleagues proposed 
detecting splogs by temporal characteristics as well as content.3 
To make splogs appear relevant to blog search engines, their 
content is updated frequently using automated frameworks. Lin’s 
method captures blog temporal characteristics in self-similarity 
matrices and detects splogs through regularity and joint features 
across different attributes.
Dennis Fetterly and his colleagues found distinct statistical 
properties to use in detecting spam pages.4 These properties 
involve the URL’s host name; in-degrees and out-degrees in the 
graphs formed by webpages and the hyperlinks between them; 
webpage rates of change on a site; and the number of similar 
pages. Several heuristics detect spam on the basis of these statis-
tical properties. Alexandros Ntoulas and his colleagues explored 
additional content-analysis heuristics.5
Several researchers have used support vector machines 
(SVMs) for text classiication, including spam iltering, because 
of their effectiveness and relative eficiency.6 In comparison 
studies for other classiication problems, SVMs have performed 
well in terms of classiication error and mean-square error.7 For 
these reasons, several studies have evaluated SVMs for blog-
spam classiication. 
Pranam Kolari has used SVMs with his colleagues for splog 
detection.8,9 In addition to the usual bag-of-words features, 
they introduced new features: bag of anchors (the anchor text 
of all URLs), bag of URLs (all tokens created by splitting URLs 
at “/”, “.”, “?”, and “=”), and bag of n-grams (n-character–long 
text tokens). They selected signiicant features on the basis of 
mutual information.
Taichi Katayama and his colleagues also used SVMs for splog 
detection, which they tested on Japanese blogs.10 Their chosen 
features included whitelisted or blacklisted URLs, noun phrases, 
noun phrases in anchor texts, link out-degrees, maximum num-
ber of outlinks from a blog homepage to any single URL, and 
number of mutual links to any other blogs.
D. Sculley and Gabriel Wachman evaluated SVM effective-
ness for blog comment spam.11 Although they found it to be 
accurate, they pointed to the training time as a prohibitive cost 
for large-scale spam detection. They proposed a computationally 
less-complex SVM called relaxed-online SVM, which they dem-
onstrated experimentally to perform equally well for blog spam.
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cumulation of endorsements from many spam pages 
can substantially raise the PageRank for a target page.
• Splogs or spam blogs—entirely fake blogs created sole-
ly to attract search engines and inluence them to 
promote a spammer’s site.3
Comment spam is intended to alter the perceived 
value of a product under discussion, alter the reputa-
tion of community members, or divert the audience’s 
interest to other products.2 It’s more challenging to 
detect than link spam, which more closely resembles 
traditional email spam, but it exhibits some identify-
ing traits: comments often unrelated to the blog topic, 
a repetition of the same words in similar patterns, a 
large number of anchor texts, and a high concentra-
tion of noun phrases.5
Spam pages have revealed some unusual statistical 
properties.1 For instance, their host names tend to be 
longer than 45 characters and to have more than six 
dots, ive dashes, or 10 digits. Their out-degrees and 
in-degrees are unusually high, and the pages exhibit a 
high average rate of change—almost all pages change 
completely every week. In addition, many spam pages 
appear to be very similar to each other.
Spam-page content has also exhibited some dis-
tinctive statistics, such as a large number of extrane-
ous words, keywords stufed in page titles, frequent 
use of composite words (that is, multiple concatenated 
words), a high percentage of text used for anchor text, 
a high percentage of visible content, and content rep-
licated multiple times.6
Spammers increase splog visibility using tricks such 
as keyword stuing or content duplication so that 
search engines will index them with a high rank in 
a particular topic.3 Splogs are characterized by ma-
chine-generated content, useless or duplicated con-
tent (copied from other blogs), commercial intent, and 
highly dynamic content. 
Our Detection Approach 
Figure 1 depicts a high-level overview of the two-
stage approach we used in our experiments to detect 
blog spam.
In the irst stage, we extracted the comment text 
and ran it against an SVM classiier that assigned it a 
score, designating its class as spam or ham (that is, legiti-
mate comments). In parallel, we used heuristic rules to 
examine the sender information and assign a reputation 
score to the sender’s identity, IP address, and email.
In the second stage, we calculated a inal overall 
score as a weighted average of the irst-stage scores.
The SVM Classiication
SVMs belong to the general class of supervised linear-
discrimination methods.7 In classifying blog comment 
text, we treated it as a “bag of words,” where features 
were common spam words. Suppose we had n fea-
tures of interest. We irst trained the SVM with N 
data points, each of which is already classiied as blog 
spam (class 1) or nonspam (class 2). 
We can visualize the data points as data vectors in 
n-dimensional space, as shown for two classes in Fig-
ure 2. The SVM classiier divides the space into regions 
and locates a new data point according to its regional 
classiication. SVMs assume that the decision bound-
ary has the form of an (n − 1)-dimensional hyperplane. 
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Figure 2. Support vector machine (SVM). In this example, the SVM has two 
classes and two features.
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Figure 1. High-level overview of approach to detecting blog spam. The 
irst stage analyzes and scores the text and sender information of each 
blog comment in parallel. The second stage assigns a weighted average to 
those scores.
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In the example, the decision boundary is a line.
The margin is the distance from the hyperplane 
to the data points in either class that are closest to it. 
The SVM classiier seeks the hyperplane that opti-
mally maximizes the margin. As Figure 2 shows, the 
problem comes down to inding a vector w that’s nor-
mal to the hyperplane minimizing ∥w∥2/2. In other 
words, it’s the solution to a standard quadratic optimi-
zation problem.7
The Heuristic Rules
To improve the SVM classiier’s accuracy, we com-
bined it with several heuristics and decided whether 
to classify a blog comment as spam by weighing the 
classifer and heuristics results in a inal score.
We based our heuristics on the reputation of the 
comment author’s IP address, email address, and iden-
tity. We assigned a weight w1 to the classiier’s deci-
sion. Similarly, we assigned weights w2, w3, and w4 
to the author’s IP reputation, email reputation, and 
identity reputation, respectively. To ind the optimal 
weights, we conducted several experiments and found 
the weights that maximized accuracy and minimized 
false positives. We calculated the total score for the 
blog comment as the summation of the weighted clas-
siier decision and the weighted reputation scores. If 
the total score exceeded a chosen threshold (t), the 
blog comment was classiied as spam.
We calculated the reputation score for these heu-
ristics by inding the spam-to-ham ratio in each case. 
For example, to calculate the reputation score for a spe-
ciic IP address, we calculated the total number of ham 
comments posted from that IP address and divided it by 
the total number of comments, whether ham or spam, 
posted from that IP address. This assigns each IP address 
a reputation score between 0 and 100 percent, with 0 
percent being the worst score. We followed the same 
approach to calculate the email and identity reputations.
Experimental Setup
In our experiments, we extracted the comment text 
from the blog comments and then built a bag-of-words 
dictionary for the terms frequently found in spam. 
We used the term-frequency/inverse-document-
frequency (TF/IDF) method to ind the terms used 
most frequently in the comments. TF/IDF assigns a 
higher weight to terms that appear often in a single 
comment but don’t appear in many comments. We 
didn’t perform stemming on terms, but we did re-
move all stopwords. We didn’t analyze URLs. We 
used the SVM classiier only to classify spam terms 
and the heuristic rules only to improve overall detec-
tion accuracy. 
We trained the classiier oline and then classiied 
new-arriving blog comments in real time. We trained 
the classiier on 884 blog comments, using a linear 
kernel and cost c = 16. The cost parameter c is the cost-
of-constraints violation, which is the constant of the 
regularization term in the Lagrange formulation. The 
total number of support vectors in this run was 1,091. 
We optimized all the input parameters to achieve the 
minimum false-positive rate.
Sixty percent of the training comments were le-
gitimate, and 40 percent were spam. Table 1 summa-
rizes the accuracy, false positives, false negatives, and 
average runtime on the 884 comments.
For the validation set, we constructed a completely 
diferent dataset. We collected 8,724,994 blog posts 
between 1 April and 1 June 2009 and tested the per-
formance of the trained model on them. Because we 
used an entirely diferent dataset from the one we used 
in training, we didn’t perform cross-validation during 
the testing phase. 
We obtained the training and validation sets from 
proprietary Defensio (www.defensio.com) logs. De-
fensio is a service that detects malware in blogs and 
Web 2.0 applications. It had collected the comments 
in these sets from various comments posted across 
several blogs. Defensio software had determined the 
comment labels—that is, ham or spam. Assuming the 
initial Defensio classiication had caused false positives 
or false negatives, the service users would have lagged 
the comments in question for reclassiication. There-
fore, we assumed the current labels in the training and 
validation sets to be accurate.
Using merely the SVM classiier, we achieved an ac-
curacy of roughly 95 percent (see Table 1). However, 
when we combined the classiier with the heuristic 
rules, the accuracy increased to almost 99 percent. Fig-
ure 3 depicts the accuracy of the SVM classiier com-
bined with the heuristics between April and June 2009.
Experimental Results: Mostly Spam
With the SVM classiier enhanced with heuristic 
rules, we carried out an experiment to measure the 
prevalence of blog spam in a corpus of 1,048,567 blog 
posts collected between 18 June and 30 June 2009. 
Our experiments showed that more than 75 percent 
Table 1. Performance of the support vector machine 
classiier during the training phase.
Measure Value
Total number of comments 884
Number of hits 837
Number of misses 47
Accuracy 0.947
False positives 24
False negatives 23
Average runtime (seconds) 0.073
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of the comments were spam. 
Traditional spammers employed evasion tech-
niques to circumvent detection. One basic method 
was to change their IP addresses, using proxies to 
avoid getting their IP addresses blacklisted by ISPs or 
webmasters. Blog spammers are using this same tech-
nique. Our experiments show that spammers used 
more than 100,000 diferent IP addresses to post spam 
comments from one email address during two weeks. 
Table 2 summarizes the top 10 ofender IP addresses, 
the total number of posted comments, and the per-
centage of spam comments.
Figure 4 graphs the number of unique IP addresses 
used by top the 10 email addresses for comment authors.
Ham and spam comments were posted from more 
than 6,000 unique autonomous systems numbers 
(ASNs). An ASN is a group of IP addresses that have 
the same routing policy. ISPs and large institutions 
can own their own ASN. Figure 5 graphs the number 
of spam posts for the top ive ofender ASNs. ASN 
29802 was responsible for more than 50 percent of 
blog spam with more than 30,000 spam posts during 
the two-week interval.
More than 30,000 diferent IP blocks were used in 
posting blog comments. Among these, six IP blocks 
were responsible for more than 50 percent of blog 
spam. An IP block is a range of IP hosts in a network. 
Usually, it’s represented by an IP address/number. For 
example, 192.168.1.1/24 covers all IP addresses in the 
range between 192.168.1.0 and 192.168.1.255. Figure 
6 depicts the top six ofender IP blocks, with IP block 
69.46.0.0/19 yielding more than 150,000 spam posts.
F rom more than one million blog posts collected in the two weeks of our experiments, more than 
75 percent of the comments were spam. Our results 
showed that thousands of IP addresses are associated 
with a few email addresses. For example, the email 
gerfercer@gmail.com was associated with more than 
100,000 unique IP addresses. This could be due to 
the use of conventional evasion techniques to avoid IP 
blacklisting, such as proxies and IP spooing.
Furthermore, the experiments found that ive 
ASNs and six IP blocks are responsible for more than 
50 percent of blog spam. This indicates that spammers 
are still leveraging conventional techniques in launch-
ing their operations. Traditional spammers used to 
rent colocation facilities—such as servers in a com-
mercial datacenter—to launch their operations.8 Now 
they rely more on botnets and compromised machines 
in launching attacks. However, the few numbers of 
ASNs and IP blocks from our experiments suggest 
that blog spammers are still using colocation facilities 
to launch their attacks. 
References
1. D. Fetterly, M. Manasse, and M. Najork, “Spam, Damn 
Spam, and Statistics,” Proc. 7th ACM Int’l Workshop Web 
and Databases, ACM Press, 2004, pp. 1–6.
2
0
0
9
-0
3
-3
0
%
2
0
0
9
-0
4
-0
2
2
0
0
9
-0
4
-0
8
2
0
0
9
-0
4
-0
5
2
0
0
9
-0
4
-1
1
2
0
0
9
-0
4
-1
4
2
0
0
9
-0
4
-1
7
2
0
0
9
-0
4
-2
0
2
0
0
9
-0
4
-2
3
2
0
0
9
-0
4
-2
6
2
0
0
9
-0
4
-2
9
2
0
0
9
-0
5
-0
2
2
0
0
9
-0
5
-0
5
2
0
0
9
-0
5
-0
8
2
0
0
9
-0
5
-1
1
2
0
0
9
-0
5
-1
4
2
0
0
9
-0
5
-1
7
2
0
0
9
-0
5
-2
0
2
0
0
9
-0
5
-2
3
2
0
0
9
-0
5
-2
6
100
98
96
94
92
90
Daily accuracy
Figure 3. SVM and heuristics combined classiication results between April 
and June 2009. The combined method identiied blog spam with almost 99 
percent accuracy over the three-month test period.
ge
rfe
rc
er
@
gm
ai
l.c
om
re
ty
ug
@
gm
ai
l.c
om
“”
.c
om
fe
rty
sik
je
t.c
om
fe
rs
de
rty
op
@
gm
ai
l.c
om
as
bi
n@
gm
ai
l.c
om
n
al
@
gm
ai
l.c
om
ds
fa
sd
er
ty
op
@
gm
ai
l.c
om
go
ril
la
@
gm
ai
l.c
om
ia
ud
i@
gm
ai
l.c
om
U
n
iq
u
e
 I
P
 a
d
d
re
ss
e
s
 (
th
o
u
sa
n
d
s)
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Figure 4. Unique IP addresses used per email address over the test period 
from 18 to 30 June 2009. The empty quotation marks in the igure 
correspond to comment authors with no email address.
Table 2. Top 10 offender IP addresses.
IP address Total posts Spam (%)
66.232.97.145 110,186 99
96.31.68.140 103,386 99
69.46.23.47 92,961 99
69.46.16.14 60,360 99
94.102.49.76 44,118 94
78.159.112.178 28,662 99
194.8.75.163 15,291 100
194.8.75.149 15,253 100
194.8.74.220 13,828 100
67.215.237.98 12,396 98
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